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Christopher Atwood
A. I. Oshirov (c. 1901-1931):
A Buriat Agent in Inner Mongolia
In the history of the Asian revolutionary movement, the term 
"Comintern representative" has come to have an unpleasant ring.^ In 
the language of the opponents of this revolution, these representatives, 
or "agents," were seen as the diabolic instigators of strife and anarchy 
who incited humble and peaceful workers and peasants to make 
destructive and nihilistic rebellion.^ Even in the historiography of the 
Asian revolutionaries themselves, the term Comintern representative 
has come to have a bad odor; whether in China, or Vietnam, or Korea, 
they are seen as ignorant dogmatists, doing incalculable harm to the 
revolution with their mechanical application of Soviet theories. Even 
more damaging, they are subject to the implicit accusation of not acting 
in good faith, putting Russia's imperial interests ahead of those of the 
colonialized peoples of Asia.^ Even in Mongolia, where the Soviet
^ I would like to thank Ochiryn Namsraijaw (Ina I. Oshirova) for her 
invaluable aid in supplying information about her brother Aleksandr. Inter­
views were conducted with her in Mongolian on April 3 and May 13, 1992, in 
Ulaanbaatar, where she lives in retirement. Without her help, this article 
could not have been written. Gyorgy Kara and Elizabeth Constantine read 
drafts of this paper and contributed important and helpful suggestions and 
corrections. Research for this article was supported in part by a grant from 
the International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX), with funds provided 
by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the United States Information 
Agency, and the United States Department of State, which administers the 
Russian, Eurasian, and East European Research Program (Title VIII).
2 See, for example, Sulian yinmou wenzheng hiiibian ["Compilation 
of documentation on Soviet plots"] (Beijing, 1928; reprint Taipei, 1987), vols. 
1-7 (vs. 402-408). One chapter of this compilation of translated documents 
seized from the Soviet embassy in April, 1927, is titled Mi tan lei, or "About 
agents."
^ See, for example. Sun Wuxia, Gongchan guoji he Zhongguo 
geming guanxi shigang (Zhengzhou, 1988). The classic example of this trend
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influence was pervasive up until the fall of the Communist system and 
where the Comintern was hence still held to be infallible, the new 
post-Communist historiography has in rapid order recapitulated the 
nationalist critiques voiced long before in China, North Korea and 
Vietnam.'^ All that was popular, good, and effective in the Mongolian 
revolution and the ensuing socialist regime is ascribed to the genius of 
native Mongolian revolutionaries, while all the cruelties and repressions 
are heaped upon the head of the Soviet Union and its Comintern 
agents. This approach gives a comforting resolution to the fundamental 
problem of Mongolian national identity—the lack of any past that is 
modem and yet not Communist. If all the good was done by the Mon­
golians and all the evil by the foreigners, then the ruling Mongolian 
People's Revolutionary Party was in essence a good party and its past a 
proud one.
The Communist International was a fundamental factor in the 
formation and development of virtually all the Asian revolutionary 
parties. Thus, despite the accusations directed against the organization, 
it is a futile enterprise to dream of what these parties might have been 
like had not Soviet influence "distorted" their development. Nor can 
the stereotype of dogmatic foreign-based bumblers and native 
revolutionary geniuses, so comforting both to American journalists like 
Harrison Salisbury hoping to "play the China card," as well as to Asian 
Communist parties in a post-Soviet era, be accepted without question.^
in Western historiography is Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and 
the Rise of Mao (New York, 1967).
^ For the old view, seeMAKhN Msch khogjikhdd olon ulsyn kommu- 
nist kh6d6lg06nii tuslamjiin roli, ach kholbogdol (Ulaanbaatar, 1978), and 
Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Nam ba olon ulsyn kommunist khOdOlgOdn: 
barimt, material (Ulaanbaatar, 1979). The new view is found, with a wealth 
of original documentation from the security archives of Mongolia, in S. Bat- 
togtokh, Nuuts khuiwaldaanaas nugalaa zawkhrald (Ulaanbaatar, 1991).
^ Richard C. Thornton, in The Comintern and the Chinese Commu­
nists, 1928-1931 (Seattle, 1969), long ago delivered a powerful critique of 
Benjamin Schwartz’s thesis that Maoism represented a struggle of the correct 
native line against obviously wrong-headed ideas imposed by ignorant Soviet 
communists and their Chinese acolytes. Shum Kui-kwong, in The Chinese 
Communists ’ Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front, 
1935-1945 (Hong Kong, 1988), has done the same for the Maoist 
historiography of the second United Front period.
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One reason this simplification has gone unchallenged for so long 
is that even the leading personalities of the Comintern lived their lives 
in secrecy and died in obscurity, often in the camps of the Soviet Gulag, 
while those who have later criticized them had all the apparatus of the 
state in their hands to spread their views. To this date, few 
monographic studies of the notorious "Comintern agents" have 
appeared.^
A study of the life of one such representative, A.I. Oshirov (c. 
1901-1931), a Buriat Mongol who was assigned to the People's 
Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia (1924-1946), demonstrates the 
inadequacy of the view that such representatives either always repre­
sented the interests of the Soviet Union over those of the local parties 
to which they were assigned, or that they were always bumblers 
demanding that everything be done exactly the way Lenin had done it in 
October. It also shows that these representatives were far from being 
pure instruments of the international Communist apparatus, with no 
thoughts other than those their programmers had instilled in them. 
Oshirov's background among the Buriats of Russian Siberia was a 
uniquely appropriate one for his work among the Mongols of China's 
Inner Mongolia. Yet if his work there had any fault it was in giving too 
much support to the local Inner Mongol party leadership and in not 
exercising enough his function of guidance and leadership. For this 
fault he was replaced, in 1927.
Yet contrary to the received view of the Comintern, the changes 
made by his replacement. M l. Amagaev, were not destructive, nor 
were they imposed on the party by force. What did almost destroy the 
party in 1928 was a series of ill-considered uprisings which were spon­
sored as much, if not more, by young hotheads in the party as by the 
advice of the Comintern. When Oshirov returned to Inner Mongolia 
after an absence of several years it was to implement another change of 
line, this time one that pushed the Inner Mongolian revolutionaries into 
close union with the Chinese Communist Party. Again, contrary to 
received opinion, this change was not unwelcome to substantial parts of
^ See the comments in Branko Lazitch, with Milorad M. 
Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern (Stanford, 1973), 
v-xiii. Mikhail Markovich Borodin seems to be the only Comintern 
representative in Asia to have received a full scale biography in English—see 
Dan N. Jacobs, Borodin: Stalin's Man in China (Cambridge, 1981).
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the Inner Mongolian party movement, although it was rejected by 
others.
Oshirov played no part in its implementation, however. He was 
captured just after crossing the border in 1931 and executed by local 
Inner Mongolian border guards. He thus participated in virtually the 
whole first stage in the history of the People's Revolutionary Party of 
Inner Mongolia. His death coincided with its eclipse, as one part 
merged with the Chinese Communists, one part gradually lost touch 
with the party center, while others to the east were reduced to being 
impotent conspirators working underground in the new Japan­
ese-sponsored Inner Mongolian autonomous governments. His in­
volvement offers a glimpse into how the implementation of the 
Communist International’s policies towards local parties was mediated 
by individuals who unavoidably brought their own personal histories 
into play.
Oshirov’s Background Among the Buriat Mongols (1901-1924)
Aleksandr Ivanovich Oshirov was born among the Buriats of 
Russia. The Buriats were Mongols who had been incorporated into the 
Russian Empire in the seventeenth century and had undergone a more 
or less profound process of cultural change and adaptation. Up 
through World War II, however, most continued to preserve their 
language and traditional religion, be it shamanism or Buddhism."^ The 
Buriats of the Ekhirit, Bulagat, and Alair clans, who lived west of Lake 
Baikal, were subject to a greater pressure from Russian immigration, 
which by the early twentieth century led to profound changes in their 
originally pastoral nomadic way of life.^ In addition, these western 
Buriats, unlike the southern (Selenge, Tsongol, and Sartuul) and east­
ern (Khori, Barguzhin, Aga) Buriats did not adopt Buddhism, and had 
relatively low literacy in the Mongol script. Thus Russian high culture, 
in the form of Russian as a written language and the Christian religion.
^ On the Buriats, see James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples of 
Siberia: Russia’s North Asian Colony, 1581-1990 (Cambridge, 1992); Caro­
line Humphrey, Karl Marx Collective: Economy Society and Religion in a 
Siberian Collective Farm (Cambridge, 1983), “Buriats” in Graham Smith, 
The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union (London, 1990), 290-303.
^ Caroline Humphrey, "The uses of genealogy: A historical study of 
the nomadic and sedentarized Buryat," in Pastoral Production and Society 
(Cambridge, 1979), 235-260.
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also spread more widely among them than it did to the south or east of 
Lake Baikal. Yet all through the Buriat lands, the nineteenth century 
saw the emergence of a Buriat intelligentsia that placed the dual 
question of identity and progress, especially as this identity related to 
Buriat religion, at center stage.^
The childhood of A. I. Oshirov well illustrates the cultural trends 
among the Buriats in the first quarter of the twentieth century. He 
was bom among the Alair Buriats living west of the Baikal, in a village 
called Togot (Mongolian Tost, Buriat Tohoto), near the present day 
town of Kunulik, on the Trans-Siberian railway. Although the village 
was purely Buriat, Aleksandr’s father, Ivan Anatol’evich Oshirov, was 
actually not a pure Buriat, but the son of Anatol Szczeglowski, a Pole 
exiled to Siberia for his participation in the Polish uprising of 1863. 
Szczeglowski married a Buriat woman, but both he and his wife died 
soon after the birth of Ivan, their only son. Left an orphan and desti­
tute, Ivan was taken in by the family of one of his wife's relatives, a 
wealthy but childless shamaness {udgan). She died soon afterwards, 
and Ivan was able to claim her property as his own. Rumor had it that 
he had in fact killed her by using her own shamanic magic. Sheep’s 
milk sliced with a knife in a special way and fed to an old person will 
supposedly kill him or her.
However that may be, Ivan turned the property he inherited 
from the old shamaness into a flourishing estate. He married a Buriat 
woman, Agafiia Vladimirovna, from the village Moilt about twelve 
kilometers from Togot. Agafiia was of the Tarkhai clan who had the 
title of shiilenge or gentry. Up to the revolution, this title was pre­
served on a leather diploma dating from the mid-seventeenth century.
^ On the revival in general, see Robert Rupen, “The Buryat Intelli­
gentsia” Far Postern Quarterly XV (1956), 383-398. On specific figures, see 
Dorji Banzarov, trans. Jan Nattier and John R. Krueger, “The Black Faith or 
Shamanism among the Mongols,'' Mongolian Studies VII (1981-2), 53-91, 
Robert Rupen, “Cyben Zamcaranovic Zamcarano,” Harvard Journal of 
Asiatic Studies, 19 (1956), 126-145; Thubten J. Norbu and Dan Martin, 
Dorjiev: Memoirs of a Tibetan Diplomat. (Hoka Bunka Kenkyu no. 17, 
1992). On the dynamic of identity and progress (or “essentialism” and 
“epochalism”) among developing and colonialized peoples, see Clifford 
Geertz’s essay “After the Revolution; The Fate of Nationalism in the New 
States” in his The Interpretation of Cultures (New York, 1973), 234-254.
The information on the childhood of A.I. Oshirov is derived from 
interviews with his younger sister Ochiryn Namsraijaw.
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before Mongolia’s division between the Manchu and Russian empires. 
Ivan's specialty was raising horses of the Orlov breed, for which he 
received a medal from the local government. The family also raised 
many other types of livestock. They also kept bees, and Ivan would 
supplement their diet with game shot in the forests. His youngest 
daughter (Ina, later Namsraijaw) remembered a childhood of abun­
dance and plenty, with fresh milk and cream available regularly. Ivan 
was a respected member of the community as well, being accepted into 
the Fourteenth Branch of the Khonggodor clan of his mother and his 
shamaness guardian. (His Russo-Buriat surname, Oshirov, also came 
from his mother's relatives.) Thus Ivan's social position combined an 
honored role within the local Buriat society with a prosperity that 
brought recognition from Russian society as well. His pale skin and 
large nose, inherited from his father, may have also helped him win 
recognition in a Siberian society in which anti-Asian racism was
becoming stronger. ^2
The Oshirov family were typical examples of the characteristi­
cally Buriat (but rapidly evolving) culture in the valley of the Angara 
River. Previously, the inhabitants of the Togot village had practiced 
trans-humance, moving between a summer and a winter camp, but the 
local Buriats felt that their traditional summer pastures had been ruined 
by the Trans-Siberian railway which was laid in this region around 
1893-5.1^ In the same period, coal mines were also opened at 
Cheremkhovo (about 25 km down the line to the south-east). As a 
result, the Khonggodor clan settled down permanently in the Togot 
village, the old winter camp.
The Oshirov family lived in a sort of permanent yurt; it had a 
traditional lattice-work 3oirt frame, but it was covered by wood, not 
felt. The mother of the family, Agafiia Vladimirovna, was a Christian 
—her whole village of Moilt had been baptized in the nearby river by the
See Great Soviet Encyclopedia: A Translation of the Third 
Edition, vol. 18 (New York, 1974), under “Orlov Trotter,” 561.
Forsyth, History of the Peoples of Siberia, 220-223. Serge Wolff, 
who met Ivan’s eldest daughter and her husband in Germany, received from 
them the impression that Ivan was a Russian man: "Mongol Delegations in 
Western Europe, 1925-1929," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 32 
(1945), 292
Stephen G. Marks, Road to Power: The Trans-Siberian Railroad 
and the Colonization of Asian Russia, 1850-1917 (Ithaca, 1991), 171-2, 
179-180.
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local Orthodox priests. Thus all the children had Christian names and 
an icon of St. Nicholas was hung on the wall. Ivan, however, stuck to 
the shamanism of his maternal ancestors and St. Nicholas had to share 
the wall with his ongods, or dolls that were home for the spirits of the 
clan ancestors, especially shamans. Only shortly before his death, in 
1926 did he abandon shamanism. By that time, however, the dominant 
role that Orthodox Christianity had played in his youth was a thing of 
the past. Ivan converted to Buddhism; he held a great feast and then 
"saw off' his ongods (pngodyg khariulakh), by taking them off into the 
forest and burning them. In the few months before his death, a table 
with the White Tara (Tsagaan Dari Ekh), a Buddhist goddess favored 
as a protectress by the Mongols, occupied the place of honor in the 
yurt.
For Ivan and Agafiia's children, at least nine of whom survived 
to adulthood, education was largely in the Russian style. The whole 
family did know the Mongol script, but the children also knew Rus­
sian. * 4 Grigorii, the eldest, was an avid reader—his favorite reading 
was the Brockhaus-Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary (Enisiklopediche- 
skii slovar' Brokgauz i Efron), which his father had at home.^^ 
Through this encyclopedia, Grigorii began to acquire a different 
cultural perspective; he made a hobby of growing tomatoes and carrots 
in a garden, but the Oshirov family retained the traditional Mongol 
disdain for vegetables and refused them. Once when a villager went 
insane, Grigorii was able to diagnose his illness using the concepts he 
had learned from the encyclopedia.
When the Russian revolution broke out, it was natural that Ivan 
Anatol'evich, as a wealthy farmer-rancher and the son-in-law of a minor 
Buriat gentry family, would support the privileged against the rebellious 
Bolsheviks. He supplied the troops of General Kappel', commander of 
Kolchak’s Second Army with food and mounts, and Agafiia 
Vladimirovna was proud to recall that Kappel', whom she considered a 
gracious and well-educated man, had once dined at their house. This
The only personal letter I have seen that was written in Mongolian 
by A.I. Oshirov was dictated to an Inner Mongolian associate. From Oshi- 
rov’s Mongolian signature on it, he does not seem to have used Mongolian as 
an everyday written language.
The Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’was published in St. Petersburg in 
82 volumes, from 1890 to 1904. The publication was a joint effort between 
F.A. Brockhaus in Leipzig and I.A. Efron in St.Petersburg.
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must have happened during Kappel's epic retreat in January, 1920, and 
demanded considerable courage on the part of the Oshirovs, as the end 
of the White regime was by then clearly in sight. Ivan Oshirov even 
allowed White detachments to store grenades in their house. With the 
collapse of the Kolchak regime in November, 1919-January, 1920, 
many friends and relatives who had fought for the Whites fled to China 
and Kholon Buir.
We know that Aleksandr Ivanovich did not follow in his par­
ents’ path and in the end joined the Bolsheviks. Unfortunately, there is 
no evidence on exactly how this happened. When the revolution broke 
out, Aleksandr, then about sixteen years old, was attending a 
non-classical high school {reaVnye uchilishchd) in Irkutsk. The Bol­
sheviks took power in Irkutsk on January 8, 1918. From the beginning, 
though, Siberia was hostile to Bolshevik sectarianism. Through his 
schoolmates, Oshirov had became involved in student political activity 
but he, too, was not a Bolshevik. Thus, when a coalition of 
non-Bolshevik parties, spearheaded by iunkers (cadets in military high 
school), staged a rebellion against the ruling party in July, Oshirov 
supported them.^^ There is no sign that he was active during the 
ensuing civil war (1918-1920 in Buriatia)-it must not be forgotten that 
he was still under twenty at the time.^^ Yet his youthful support for 
the iunker rebellion placed him in great danger of being taken auto­
matically for an anti-Bolshevik, should the Bolsheviks return.
The first Soviet government in Siberia was overthrown by for­
eign intervention in June-August, 1918. From that point forward, a 
partisan movement had operated at a low level among Siberia's peas­
ants. By September, 1919, the arbitrary exactions of the White regime 
and its Allied supporters had caused this movement to mushroom. 
Beginning in November 1919, partisans were active in the Alair and 
other Buriat regions west of the Baikal, but there is no evidence that
See Great Soviet Encyclopedia: A Translation of the Third 
Edition, vol. 21 (New York, 1975), under "realschule," 528, and vol. 30 
(1982), under "iunker," 448. Irkutsk had both a Iunker school and a 
preparatory school for the Siberian cadets corps--see Entsiklopedicheskii 
slovar’vol. 25 (St. Petersburg, 1894), under "Irkutsk."
On the Russian revolution in Buryatia, see Russel E. Snow, "The 
Russian Revolution of 1917-18 in Transbaikalia," Soviet Studies 23 (1971-2), 
201-215, and The Bolsheviks in Siberia, 1917-1918 (London, 1977).
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A.I. Oshirov was involved with them.l* As the Kolchak regime disin­
tegrated and the Red Army advanced from the west, Mensheviks, 
Social Revolutionaries, and some Bolsheviks created a leading organ, 
called the Political Center, to demand an end to the White regime. 
From December 19, 1919, onwards, regiments under the Center’s con­
trol began to openly seize power in town after town in Central Siberia. 
The Political Center finally came to power in Irkutsk on January 5, 
1920 and executed Admiral Kolchak on Febrary 7, 1920. The Political 
Center hoped to establish a buffer region between the Soviet gov­
ernment to the west and the Japanese occupied area to the east, but 
within a few weeks Bolshevik elements in Irkutsk had, supported by the 
advancing Red Army, dispersed the Political Center and brought the 
Soviet republic's borders to the shores of Lake Baikal. The buffer plan 
was, however, put into effect east of the Baikal, where the Far Eastern 
Republic was formed. Its leadership was, behind the scenes, securely in 
Communist hands.
At first, the local Bolsheviks and their Buriat supporters 
declared that under the Soviet regime, the Buriats "have no need of any 
autonomy whatsoever." From Moscow, however, Lenin intervened in 
January, 1921, to create a Central Committee of the Buriat-Mongols of 
East Siberia. For almost a year, he was unable to secure the formation 
of a definite Buriat autonomous area. The creation of a Buriat-Mongol 
Autonomous Region in the Far Eastern Republic, however, pushed the 
Irkutsk government to create its own Mongol-Buriat [sic] Autonomous 
Region on January 9, 1922. Although the territory, a non-contiguous 
patchwork of five districts (aimag), was 70% Buriat, only about 100 of 
the grand total of 353 Communist Party members were Buriat.^9 It 
was in this context that many figures who might otherwise have been 
treated with disdain were allowed into the party and government, and 
among them was Oshirov.
G.D. Basaev and S.I. Erbanova, MAi Erbanov (Ulan-Ude, 1989), 
39-40. On the partisans in Siberia, see David Footman, "Siberian partisans in 
the Civil War," Soviet Affairs 1 (1956), 24-53.
^ ^ On the Civil War in Buriatia and the restoration of the Communist 
regime there, see Edward Hallett Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923 
(New York, 1951), 350-363 and Paul Dotsenko, The Struggle for Democracy 
in Siberia, J97 7-7920 (Stanford, 1983), 110-120.
29 Boris Chichlo, “Histoire de la formation des territoires autonomes 
chez les peuples turco-mongols de la Siberie,” Cahiers du monde russe et 
sovietique 28 (1987), 362-401, and especially, 367-371.
A Buriat Agent in Inner Mongolia 53
In December, 1922, at the First Congress of Soviets of the 
Buri^t-Mongol Autonomous Regional, A.I. Oshirov was elected to the 
fourteen-man Regional Executive Committee (oblispolkom) of the 
Russian Republic’s Mongol-Buriat region.21 With the final withdrawal 
of the Japanese from the Siberian mainland, and the merger of the Far 
Eastern Republic with the Russian Republic in October 1922, the two 
republics' autonomous regions were merged and elevated to form the 
Buriat-Mongol Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (BMASSR) as 
proclaimed on May 22, 1923. As an Autonomous Republic, this new 
state had a Soviet (or Council) of People's Commissars, just as did the 
Soviet Union as a whole. Here A.I. Oshirov, barely in his twenties, 
served as People's Commissar of Agriculture.22
The Soviet Union & Inner Mongolia: Forming a Policy 
(1924-1927)
The Soviet Union and China established diplomatic relations in 
May, 1924. The new ambassador. Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan 
(1889-1937), quickly began to set up the apparatus to implement the 
Soviet Union's two-fold policy: regular diplomatic relations through 
formal embassy personnel, and clandestine contacts with various dissi­
dent forces in China, carried on both by the Communist International 
and the Soviet military advisers.2^ Oshirov was chosen to play a role in 
this second, highly sensitive, aspect of Soviet policy. From the 
beginning, both the Buriat Mongols and Russian Siberian Communist 
organization played an important role in the formation of the USSR's 
Asian policy. The Communist International's Secretariat for the Far 
East, formed in 1921, was chaired by Boris Zakharovich Shumiatskii 
(1886-1943), the Communist Party boss of Siberia.24 It also included 
the red-haired Grigorii Naumovich Voitinskii (1893-1953) and his wife 
Mariia Kuznetsova. In spring, 1920, Voitinskii had undertaken one of 
the first Soviet Communist missions to China and from November,
Basaev and Erbanova, M.N. Erbanov, 66-67.
22 Interview with Ochiryn Namsraijaw, April 3 and May 13, 1992.
22 See his biography, V.V. Sokolov, Na boevykh postakh diplo- 
maticheskogo fronta: zhizn' i deiatel ’nost ’ L.M. Karakhana (Moscow, 
1983).
24 See Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary of the 
Comintern, under "Shumiatsky, Boris Zakharovich" and S. Demberel, Nert 
Khuwisgalch B.Z. Shumyatskii {\]\azinh<xaia.v, 1975).
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1923, to July, 1927, he was the senior representative of the Comintern 
in China.^^ Another member of the Far Eastern Secretariat was Mikhei 
Nikolaevich Erbanov (1889-1938), who was Oshirov's superior, both 
as the chairman of the Regional Executive Committee of the RSFSR's 
Mongol-Buriat Autonomous Region, and as the Chairman of the 
Council of People's Commissars in the BMASSR.^^ Erbanov quite 
possibly brought Oshirov to the attention of the Secretariat as a 
potential representative.
From its very inception, the Buriat-Mongol Republic was 
closely linked to the Soviet Union's hopes for influence in the east.^7 
The Russian People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs had strongly 
advocated raising Buriat autonomy from the provincial to the 
autonomous republic level precisely in order to demonstrate to the 
Asian peoples the uniqueness of Soviet Russia's minority policy.^* At 
the same time, the Siberian organization was likewise closely involved. 
In July, 1920, an Oriental Political Bureau was created under B.Z. 
Shumiatskii's Siberian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party’s 
Central Committee. The Bureau was organized into four departments: 
Mongolian-Tibetan, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean. It primarily dealt 
with the peoples of those nationalities who lived in Siberia, although its 
propaganda was meant to have wider influence. The Mongol­
ian-Tibetan Department was particularly active in promoting the 
development of the Mongolian People's Party of Outer Mongolia into a 
significant force in winter 1920-1921, organizing Buriats like 
El’bekdorzhi R. Rinchino and Tsyben Zh. Zhamtsarano to join the 
party. The Department also published the newspaper Monggol-un 
linen ("Mongolia's Truth"), in Mongolian.
See Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary of the 
Comintern, under "Voitinski, Grigori" and Janies Pinckney Harrison, The 
Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 
7927-7972 (New York, 1972), 27-30, 55, 67-8, 100-101, 120.
See the photograph in Basaev and Erbanova, M.N. Erbanov, plate 
3.
The following discussion of the Comintern’s relations with East 
Asia and Mongolia derives, apart from the sources mentioned, from an 
interview conducted in April, 1992, with Dr. Sanjiin Damdinsiiren 
(Ulaanbaatar) who has worked extensively in Comintern and MPRP archives. 
1 would like to record here my thanks to him.
2^ Chichlo, "Histoire de la formatiog des territoires autonomes . . ." 
Cahiers du monde russes et sovietiques 28 (1987), 370.
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In June 1921, the Communist International set up its own 
Secretariat for the Far East. At that time, the Mongolian-Tibetan 
Committee was transferred to the Comintern, which was the regular 
channel for international revolutionaiy activity. In fact, though, since 
the Secretariat was headed by B.Z. Shumiatskii, the difference between 
the old set-up (under the Siberian Bureau) and the new one (under the 
Comintern's Secretariat for the Far East) was nominal. After April, 
when the People's Army led by the Mongolian People's Party built a 
base in Mongolia, the Mongolian Tibetan Department and its 
Monggol-un Unen lapsed, being replaced by direct ties between Mon­
golia and the Comintern. Many Buriats, of whom E.R. Rinchino and 
Ts. Zh. Zhamtsarano were only the most prominent, moved south to 
Mongolia in the wake of the Mongolian People's Party's victory. Most 
of these initial Buriat advisers were suspect characters in their own 
homeland, former Social Revolutionaries under a cloud for previous 
nationalist and anti-Bolshevik activity. Rather than simply liquidating 
them, however, the Russian Communists encouraged them to go south 
and work to develop Mongolia along revolutionary lines.
The Comintern's Secretariat for the Far East was abolished 
early in 1922, and replaced by the Eastern Department, which was 
under the Comintern's general Secretariat. Shumiatskii, who was being 
ap-pointed as ambassador to Persia, was replaced as head of the new 
organ by a hotblooded revolutionary romantic, Fedor Fedorovich 
Raskolnikov (alias Petrov, 1892-1939).In 1924, in the wake of the 
controversy surrounding the execution of S. Danzan, the Comintern's 
links to the Mongolian People's Party were strengthened. The People's 
Party was officially admitted as a candidate member of the Comintern, 
with deliberative rights in its Congresses. In August 1924, the Kazak 
Bolshevik Turar Ryskulovich Ryskulov (alias Khasagbai/Kazakbay,
Robert Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, vol. 1 
(Bloomington, 1964), 201-203, 239. Of course Zhamtsarano and other 
Buriats had been active in Mongolia during its first period of independ­
ence/autonomy (1911-1919) as well.
See biographical notes in Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Biographical 
Dictionary of the Comintern, under "Raskolnikov, Feodor F." and the sketch 
in Georges Haupt and Jean-Jacques Marie, trans. C.I.P. Ferdinand and D.M. 
Bellos, Makers of the Russian Revolution: Biographies of Bolshevik Leaders 
(London, 1974), 202-208.
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1894-193 8),was assigned as the first representative; in summer, 
1925, he was replaced by Matvei Innokent’evich Amagaev 
(1897-1937), a Buriat Bolshevik who had earlier been a member of the 
Central Committee of Buriat-Mongols of Eastern Siberia and chairman 
of the Far Eastern Republic's Buriat Region, then a member of the 
Presidium of the BMASSR's Communist Party Committee.32 These 
appointments mark the eclipse of Social-Revolutionaries, nationalists, 
and other politically unreliable persons in the Comintern's Mongolian 
operations and their replacement by Bolsheviks, albeit ones often of 
non-ethnic Russian origin. At the same time, a Mongolian Com­
mission was organized in the Far Eastern Department to serve as a kind 
of think-tank for the Comintern's Mongolian policy. Ryskulov and 
Amagaev were made members, as was Moscow's first consul in 
Mongolia, A.N. Vasil'ev, and Nikolai Bukharin in Moscow.33
Raskolnikov's Eastern Department also served as the 
Comintern's main supervisor for policy towards East Asia (China, 
Korea, and Japan) as well as Indochina and the Dutch Indies. From 
1923 on, the East Asian operation seems to have been under the 
supervision of Grigorii Voitinskii, then living in Shanghai. As a result, 
perhaps, of the wide range of tasks for which Voitinskii was responsi­
ble and the difficulty of maintaining underground communications, he 
was able to exercise only a loose coordinating role between the various 
party organizations in each area. In the Guomindang’s southern base, 
he tended to be eclipsed by the Comintern/Russian Communist Party 
representative, Mikhail M. Borodin, and in Beijing by the Soviet 
ambassador Lev M. Karakhan.34 In Inner Mongolia, the earliest links 
to native revolutionaries were undertaken by El’bekdorzhi Rinchino. 
As the Communist International became aware of the revolutionary 
possibilities in Inner Mongolia in the spring and summer of 1925, it 
came to view the Inner Mongolian revolution primarily as part of the
See the biographical notes in Aleksandre A. Bennigsen and S. 
Enders Wimbush, Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A 
Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World (Chicago, 1979), 205-6.
See his biography, N.P. Egunov, M.l. Amagaev (Ulan-Ude, 1974).
Biographical notes on A.N. Vasil’ev in Mongol Ardyn Namyn 
Gurawdugaar Ikh Khural: 1924 ony naim-yesdiigeer sar: delgerengiii 
temdeglel (Ulaanbaatar, 1966), 258. On the Commission and Bukharin’s 
views therein, see O. Batsaikhan, "Mongol owogtny negdekhiig eserguiitsekh," 
II Towchoo (Ulaanbaatar), no. 7 (40), March 1-10, 1992.
Harrison, Long March to Power, 67.
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Chinese revolution. Thus it was also put under Voitinskii's general 
supervision. In line with this policy, Ryskulov and Amagaev repeatedly 
asked the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (as the People's 
Party was renamed in spring, 1925) to refrain from making direct 
contact with the Inner Mongols and instead to channel all such contact 
through the Communist International.
In 1924, young, politically active Inner Mongols were all 
responding to the Mongolian revolution of 1921.^^ In 1922, one 
group, based in the rich steppes of Kholdn Buir, in the northeast corner 
of Inner Mongolia, had organized an Eastern Border People's Party 
(Doronadu Khijagar-un Arad-im Nam, also known by its unofficial 
name as the Kholdn Buir Youth Party). Led by a Daur Mongol, Merse, 
this weakly organized group enjoyed the exclusive patronage of the 
Mongolian People's Party for two years (1922-1924). El'bekdorzhi R. 
Rinchino, the powerful Buriat in the Mongolian People's Party, was 
their main supporter.
Another group of Mongols, mostly in their thirties and forties 
and from more Chinese influenced areas of Chakhar and Eastern Inner 
Mongolia, were members of the Chinese Guomindang. In 1923, they 
allied with Merse and began creating their own Inner Mongolian 
revolutionary organization. In April 1924, a Kharachin Mongol, Ser- 
engdonrub, went to independent Mongolia with a proposal to create an 
ethnically-based Inner Mongol party, to be called the People's Revo­
lutionary Party of Inner Mongolia.
On the Inner Mongolian revolutionary movement and the People’s 
Revolutionary Party from 1924 to 1931, see Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei 
zhanzheng shiqi de Nei Menggu Renmin Geming Dang," in Zhongguo 
Menggu Shi Xuehui chengli dahui jinian Jikan (Khokliekhota, 1979), 
580-604, L. Jamsran, "MAKhN, Owdr Mongolyn Ardyn kliuwisgalt nam 
liiisch bekhjikhed tusalsan ni," Dornodakhiny sudlal, 1991, no. 1 (24), 11-17, 
and Christopher A^vood, "National Party and Local Politics in Ordos, Inner 
Mongolia (1926-1935)," Journal of Asian History 26 (1992), 1-30.
Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party, Central Party Archives 
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Probably the earliest Inner Mongols to get in contact with the 
Soviet embassy were some agrarian radicals from Ordos, on the bend 
of the Yellow River in southwest Inner Mongolia. From the 
mid-nineteenth century, these radicals had been organized into 
duguilangs, or "circles." In recent years, however, the native Mongol 
princes, helped by the Chinese military authorities, had almost entirely 
suppressed the duguilangs. The rebel leaders were forced to either 
stop their activity or go into exile. Among the exiles were two in Bei­
jing: Wangdanima, the Bandida Gegen, or incarnate lama of Jasag 
Banner, and Oljeijirgal, a clerk and duguilang leader from Uiishin 
banner. Wangdanima was close to Serengdonrub's group, but the 
Uiishin leader, Oljeijirgal, aimed to link the Ordos duguilangs directly 
to the new Mongolian government. He left for Mongolia in August, 
1924, taking fifteen duguilang comrades from Uiishin banner with him 
to plead for aid and acquire a political and military education.
In the fall of 1924, another of the Chinese republic’s intermin­
able warlord conflicts had broken out. This time. Marshal Feng 
Yuxiang (1882-1948), a relatively progressive-minded commander, was 
able to occupy Beijing. He declared a truce, however, with the 
reactionary Zhang Zuolin (18757-1928), warlord of Northeast China, a 
truce which allowed Zhang's forces to share in the occupation of Bei­
jing. Feng expelled the former Qing Emperor, Puyi, from the Forbid­
den City, declared that the Chinese republic would tolerate no more 
monarchist revivals and renamed his troops the Citizen Army {Guo- 
minjun). By December 1925, Feng’s Citizen Army had taken control 
of the western half of Inner Mongolia.^*
Overnight, this development changed the political possibilities in 
Inner Mongolia. Merse, from the Eastern Border People's Party, went 
south to Beijing to examine the new situation. There he met Guomin- 
dang Mongols in Beijing, such as Serengdonrub. Together, in early 
December 1924, they formed the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner 
Mongolia that had first been proposed to Mongolia the previous
(Beijing), Jan. 31, 1927; Zhonghua Minguo shishi jiyao (chugao) 1924, vol. 
1 (Yonghe County, 1979), 416-7; MPRP, Central Party Archives, 7-1-20; 
8-11,7-1-19: 1.
James C. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng 
Yti-hsiang (Stanford, 1966); Gavan McCormack, Chang Tso-lin in Northeast 
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April.39 Sun Yat-sen, leading the pro-Soviet Guomindang party in 
southern China, also saw great opportunities for a peaceful reunifica­
tion of China. That month, Sun Yat-sen came north to Beijing and 
appointed Guomindang party representatives to go to each province 
and agitate for a National Assembly. Serengdonrub and a young 
Communist Mongol were appointed to do this work among the Mon­
gols of Inner Mongolia.'^®
Marshal Feng's new territory, however large, lacked either a 
seaport or an arsenal. If he wished to keep his Citizen Army armed he 
would have to turn to the Soviet Union which could supply him over­
land via the Mongolian People's Republic. From March on, the 
Chinese Citizen Armies and the Soviet Union began courting each 
other. In this new atmosphere, Soviet citizens acquired a new freedom 
to leave the embassy and visit the countryside. Until then they had only 
been able to work in Beijing. There, in summer, 1924, Oshirov, going 
under the more standard Mongol form of his name (either as Ochir, 
Ochirov, or Ochirun), had begun working out of the Soviet Union's 
Beijing embassy, along with a Russian military man named Ledogorov. 
In that year, Oshirov got to know some popular leaders from the Ordos 
region in western Inner Mongolia. Oshirov impressed them as a good 
man, but his Russian customs, such as embracing and kissing old 
acquaintances mystified the more traditional Ordos Mongols.In 
March, 1925, however, A.I. Oshirov, in the company of He Zishen, a 
representative of the Chinese Communist Party's Beijing-based 
Northern Committee, made what was probably his first trip into the 
Inner Mongolian countryside.
Through the summer of 1925, Oshirov's main task, along with 
Comintern representatives in Mongolia itself, like Turar R. Ryskulov,
39 Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn Dorowdugeer Ikh Khural: 
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was getting the disparate political groups in Inner Mongolia to cease 
relying solely on salvation from Mongolia, and begin relying more on 
each other. The new People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia 
(PRPIM, Mongolian Dotoodu Monggol-un Arad-un Khubiskhaltu 
Nam) encompassed Serengdonrub’s Guomindang group, as well as 
some of the Khdlon Buir group and Wangdanima from the Ordos 
group. Yet the Khdlon Buir-based Eastern Border People's Party 
(EBPP) was still officially separate with much of its leadership in 
Ulaanbaatar. In February 1925, another party appeared, the Inner 
Mongolian Youth Party (Dotoodu Monggol-un Jaluuchud-un Nam)A^ 
It was composed of young Mongol students from Beijing's Mongolian 
and Tibetan school, in their twenties or late teens, almost all from ban­
ners with heavy Chinese settlement where the Mongols themselves 
were beginning to take up farming. The party was inspired by Sosor- 
dawa, a Mongol from independent Mongolia's youth league, who in 
fall, 1924, came to Beijing to proclaim the gospel of radical 
pan-Mongolist ideas. Pan-Mongolian in its thinking, the Youth Party 
was strongly hostile to the PRPIM, calling it the party of the rich and 
the nobility.
All of these parties were in a competition for the favor of the 
Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) or both. 
Originally the EBPP had the inside track in Ulaanbaatar, but its patron 
Rinchino was recalled to Buriatia that summer in semi-disgrace. The 
PRPIM had two advantages which proved telling; it carried with it the 
blessing of support from Sun Yat-sen and the Guomindang center and 
it counted members from all over Inner Mongolia. Given that the 
Soviet Union was committed to the Guomindang as the central force in 
China's revolution (and that it hoped to build up a powerful all-inner 
Mongolian organization), these two properties were crucial. In con­
trast, the EBPP was amorphous and existed only in a small area, and 
the Youth Party was too young, too socially radical, and too 
pan-Mongolist.
This party should not be confused either with the "Khdlon Buir 
Youth Party," the commonly found, unofficial name of the Eastern Border 
People’s Party (EBPP), or the Young Men’s Party of South Mongolia (Obdr 
Monggol-un Jaluus-un Nam) of the 1940s.
44 Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, Wulanfu huiyilu (Beijing, 
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The People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia got in 
touch with visiting Mongolian dignitaries in late April, 1925. Party 
members approached the Soviet embassy in Beijing in the second half 
of May, 1925, if not before, and the ambassador Karakhan was 
amenable to arming Inner Mongol troops as long as approval for such a 
force by Marshal Feng, the local authority, could be arranged. As one 
embassy report, possibly by Oshirov, put it:
We must admit that . . . even supposing that these organizations 
[the PRPIM and an alliance of Chinese militias] as a whole will 
be able to get together only one half of the number of men they 
promised, i.e. 5,000, still such a mass of cavalry in the rear of 
Chang Tso-lin [Zhang Zuolin] may decide the issue of the war."^^
From May to July 1925, Serengdonrub and comrades were in Ulaan- 
baatar negotiating with the leadership of the Mongolian People's 
Revolutionary Party (MPRP). Their proposals envisioned a merger of 
the PRPIM with the EBPP, the subordination of both to the MPRP, 
and financial and military aid from the Soviet Union and Mongolia."^^
The MPRP supported these proposals, as long as the role of the 
MPRP was kept secret, and was preparing to send a representative to 
Moscow to ratify this policy. In July, however, Grigorii Voitinskii, the 
Comintern representative in Shanghai and Oshirov's boss, passed 
through Ulaanbaatar on unrelated business. When he heard what was 
going on, he asked the MPRP to delay sending any representative to 
Moscow. Voitinskii asked that the MPRP not interfere directly in the 
affairs of the Inner Mongolian party, leaving that up to the Communist 
International's organization in China. The crucial point was that policy 
towards Inner Mongolia had to be coordinated with policy towards 
China, especially towards the Guomindang and Marshal Feng's Citizen 
Army. Serengdonrub and the others had no choice but to go along— 
after all, what they needed above all was money and weapons, and 
ultimately the Soviet Union was the only source for that—but the Inner 
Mongols were not happy about it."^^
The task of unifying the Inner Mongolian parties was compli­
cated by the role of Li Dazhao (1888-1927), the main Chinese Com-
Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian, vol. 7 (v. 408), 112.
MPRP Central Party Archives, 7-1-18: 24-26, 29-31.
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munist in Beijing Although he himself insisted that the Inner Mon­
golian revolution was an inter-ethnic task, involving both Chinese and 
Mongols, Li was influential among the young Mongol students in Bei­
jing, even among those who formed the Youth Party. Li assigned a 
Chinese disciple of his, Han Linfu, to bring together an Inner Mongo­
lian front organization that would embody the Communist program of 
an inter-ethnic Inner Mongolian struggle. Han was unable to recruit 
successfully among Mongols, however, and hence turned to ethnic 
Chinese farmers and bandit groups in the southern part of Inner Mon­
golia, with only a few Mongol students participating. The resulting 
front, called the Grand Alliance of Inner Mongolian Peasants, Workers, 
and Soldiers, approached Oshirov at the Soviet embassy in May, 1925, 
asking for it to intercede with Marshal Feng on their behalf, and also to 
supply them with ammunition.
The Soviet embassy was thus presented with a murky, 
three-cornered relationship between the Grand Alliance, the Youth 
Party, and the PRPIM. The Grand Alliance had some kind of relations 
with the PRPIM, but they were not close. The Youth Party and Ser- 
engdonrub’s PRPIM were both exclusively Mongol parties, but the 
former was younger, more radical, and more alienated from the Mongol 
elite. The Grand Alliance's idea of a multi-ethnic revolutionary struggle 
would seem to exclude the Youth Party's pan-Mongolism, but in 
recruiting Mongols the Chinese Communist Party and the Youth Party 
successfully drew on essentially the same pool of students in Beijing's 
Mongolian and Tibetan School. Many young Mongols joined the 
Youth Party and the Chinese Communist Party simultaneously.
The ramifications of these conflicts extended beyond Inner 
Mongolian politics alone. Li Dazhao and Han Linfu were not only 
Communists, they were also members of the Guomindang, and among 
the most active members of the Beijing Political Council (BPC), the 
major GMD organization in northern China.The BPC handled
See Maurice Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese 
Marxism (New York, 1973).
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The Beijing Political Council contained nine members, of whom 
four, Li Dazhao, Han Linfii (Communist faction), Xu Qian (Left Guomin­
dang), and Yu Youren (centrist), showed evidence of interest in the Inner 
Mongolian question.
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negotiations both with the Mongolian People's Republic and with the 
Soviet Union. Serengdonnab, despite having been appointed by Sun 
Yat-sen as the chief GMD figure in Inner Mongolia, was not a member 
and a rivalry between Li Dazhao and Serengdonrub over who would 
control Inner Mongolian policy can be traced back as far as the First 
Congress of the GMD in January 1924. Since Serengdonrub was close 
to Dambadorji and other members of the Mongolian government, ten­
sion between him and the PRPIM on the one hand and Li, Han, the 
BPC, and the Inner Mongolian Youth Party on the other, could derail 
the already not-very-stable relations between Mongolia and the GMD. 
At the same time, it could lead to an exacerbation of relations between 
the right and left in the United Front the Comintern was trying to hold 
together.
It fell to Oshirov to try to reconcile the two Inner Mongol 
parties. Both were too promising to be ignored: in July-August, the 
PRPIM had 300 full members and 3,000 candidates, while the Youth 
Party had only 30 full members but somewhere between 800 to 1,500 
candidate members.^ 1 When Serengdonrub returned to Beijing in July, 
he met with Karakhan, Oshirov, and Li Dazhao. The latter, in his 
capacity as a member of the BPC, gave the formal approval of the 
Guomindang to organize the PRPIM, but seems to have extracted an 
understanding from Serengdonrub that his hitherto all-Mongol 
organization would admit ethnic Chinese.^^ Serengdonrub refused to 
accept this denouement, however, and relations between the PRPIM 
and the Soviet Union and the BPC seem to have cooled. At the party's 
Provisional Meeting of July 26, 1925, the Mongolian People's 
Revolutionary Party (MPRP)'s representative in Beijing attended, but 
neither Oshirov nor any representative of the Soviet Union or the BPC 
was invited. Serengdonrub’s report (delivered at the assembly) on the 
latest party activities mentioned only the mission to Ulaanbaatar and 
ignored all of the important talks with the Soviet embassy.
Afterwards, however, Oshirov proved to Serengdonrub the 
worth of the Comintern ties by mediating a dispute between the Youth 
Party and the PRPIM. By the middle of August, notes one observer, 
"He has given [the two parties] the appearance of friendship," and.
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perhaps as a reward, Oshirov was invited to join in drawing up the 
documents to be ratified at the October Congress. By the opening of 
the first Congress of the PRPIM, which would seal the unification of 
the various groups, Oshirov had managed to get the Inner Mongolia 
Youth Party to dissolve and join the PRPIM in a subordinate role. The 
new party, however, would be a purely ethnic Mongol party. No ethnic 
Chinese would be given membership. The Grand Alliance was kept 
separate, although the two ethnic Mongols in its leadership were 
elected as alternate members of the PRPIM's Central Committee. 
The Inner Mongolian Party was to have deliberative rights in the 
Comintern's Congresses, just as did the Mongolian People's 
Revolutionary Party and the Chinese Guomindang.^^
Meanwhile in Ulaanbaatar, Oljeijirgal was informed that the 
MPRP would provide no direct aid to him or the Uiishin duguilangs. 
Assistance would come only through the PRPIM. Reluctantly, 
Oljeijirgal agreeed to attend the first Congress, planned for October in 
Zhangjiakou. The remaining members of the Eastern Border People's 
Party also tried to preserve their organizational independence, pointing 
out how the special geographical position of Kholon Buir made 
revolutionary prospects there especially bright, but the EBPP too was 
pushed into union with the PRPIM.
The Rehe and Ordos Campaigns: 1925-1927
By the time of the first, constituent. Congress of the PRPIM, 
A.I. Oshirov had begun to establish his position as an adviser on 
northern Chinese politics. When the question came up of who to send 
as the MPRP’s representative to the Guomindang, Amagaev, the 
Comintern's representative in Ulaanbaatar, asked that the Central 
Committee first consult with Oshirov. At the Congress, Oshirov was
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one of only three outsiders included in the official photographs-the 
others were Dambadorji, the chairman of the Mongolian People's 
Revolutionary Party, and Buyannemekhu, a talented Mongolian writer 
and poet sent to help the Inner Mongols with propaganda and 
pamphleteering. Even so, in negotiations over supplying Soviet 
weapons for a planned Inner Mongol military force, it was not Oshirov 
but Grigorii Voitinskii and the assistant military attache Voronin who 
had the authority to commit the Soviet side.^^
For the next year and a half, Oshirov would follow the Central 
Committee as it campaigned first in Rehe and then as it retreated west 
into Ordos. Yet far from acting as the all-powerful Comintern agent, 
dictating strategy, he appears in the record primarily as a messenger for 
the Central Committee. His main task seems to have been to assure a 
steady supply of guns and money to the party. He did not receive much 
thanks for taking on this task. Nowhere are his endeavors noted with 
the kind of generous thanks which Serengdonrub and Merse expressed 
about Nasunbatu (1891-1937), a Mongolian Central Committee 
member sent to Inner Mongolia to advise the PRPIM from August to 
November, 1926. Again, Oshirov's age may well have been a factor- 
he was ten to fifteen years younger than the leaders of the PRPIM. 
Indeed, in biographical notices on the PRPIM leaders he consistently 
overestimated their ages by five years or more.^^
Yet another factor may have been his lack of any significant 
Buriat revolutionary experience. Nowhere in the two lengthy reports 
on the party that he wrote for the Soviet embassy or in the letter he 
wrote to the party CC does he ever refer to the historical experiences 
of Buriatia in the Russian Civil War, or indeed to any aspect of Buriat 
politics at all. This deprived him of the chance to deliver instruction as 
one more experienced in the art of Revolution, a pose which Borodin, 
Voitinskii, and other Russians in China frequently adopted.Indeed
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he at least once overestimated the experience of his Inner Mongol col­
laborators, claiming that one Murungga had been elected to the Chinese 
parliament and worked with Sun Yat-sen, when in fact it was 
Murungga’s father who had done so.^®
Yet in his reports, especially his final report on the party, deliv­
ered to the embassy on December 6, 1926, before he left for Southern 
China, Oshirov shows an understanding of the local politics of Inner 
Mongolia, both as it related to the personalities in the party and the 
local political realities. Unlike other Soviet advisers, he was well aware 
of Marshal Feng's unpopularity among the Mongol grass- roots.^^ He 
was also able to overcome common prejudices among foreigners about 
Mongolian lamas and accurately relate their unexpectedly "progressive" 
attitude to the local economic background. Finally, he seems to have 
been the only outsider to discern the profound internal cleavages 
among the Inner Mongols, and relate them to differing levels of 
influence by Chinese culture. His main deficiency was a tendency to be 
carried away with enthusiasm. He always managed to find a silver 
lining in every cloud. For example, in discussing the sharp personal 
feuds which wracked the party, he concluded that these very feuds 
made each leader anxious to recruit more followers, which led to a 
rapid expansion of the party ranks.^^ At the same time, he also 
showed little awareness of the aims and counsels of Serengdonrub, who 
became increasingly autocratic as the party's fortunes waned. Thus 
although his reports do contain sharp insights, they tend to be 
impressionistic, lacking a sense of what the inner council was planning 
at any given moment. Serengdonrub seems to have aimed at keeping 
the Soviet representative at arm's length while drawing the Mongolian 
government in closer.
After its October Congress, the PRPIM became closely 
involved in the campaigns of Feng's Citizen Army. Growing tensions 
with Zhang Zuolin's Fengtian Army led, on November 22, 1925, to
Frustrated Patriot (New York, 1976), 178, 193; Xenia Joukoff Eudin and 
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war. On December 3, 1925, Marshal Feng ordered his First Army to 
invade Rehe.^^ According to the agreements reached after the 
Congress, the PRPIM was to lead a Mongol force to take over the 
northern part of this region—Jingpeng, Linxi, and Wudan counties— 
while another army formed from bandits led by Li Dazhao's Grand 
Alliance of Inner Mongolian Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers was to 
capture Chifeng. By the time that Feng had ordered the attack, 
however, the weapons promised from the Soviet Union to arm the 
Inner Mongols still had not come.
In early November, Voitinskii and the embassy's assistant mili­
tary attache, Voronin, asked the Mongols to send some of their 
Soviet-supplied weapons to Inner Mongolia with the understanding 
that the Soviet Union would replace them. The replies from Ulaan- 
baatar, however, avoided mentioning weapons. On November 13, the 
party's Central Committee then wrote an imploring letter to the MPRP 
Central Committee asking them to act quickly. Likewise, Oshirov "on 
instructions from the Inner Mongolian People’s Party [i.e., the 
PRPIM]" wired Dambadorji and Amagaev from Beijing to send weap­
ons and if necessary borrow them from Soviet stores on hand.^'^ The 
existing PRPIM troops, formed from a local Mongol banner militia, 
numbered 500-600, of whom little more than half were armed. The 
commander Murungga, a presidium member and local official, had been 
chosen to lead because the basic militia had earlier been his own force. 
Although the weapons had not arrived, Murungga attacked anyway. 
Miraculously the troops succeeded in taking all the cities assigned to 
them. The low morale of the enemy soldiers, ravaged by opium, and 
the conspicuous cowardice of their commanders who fled at the first 
report of enemy action were responsible for this easy victory. The 
Inner Mongol army swelled to 3,000—of whom perhaps 1,100 were 
armed.
Oshirov had been near the front, but went back to Beijing 
before the capture of Wudan. Based on a letter from Murungga dated 
December 12, he delivered an optimistic report to his superiors, detail­
ing the party's plans to expand the army to five thousand and develop 
the offensive towards the northwest, eventually into Kholon Buir.
On the Rehe campaign see Oshirov’s report of December 17, 
1925, with comments by Egorov, the Beijing military attache in Sulian 
yinmou wenzheng huibian, vol. 7 (v.408), 101-109.
MPRP Central Party Archives: 7-1-19: 4-7; 7-1-23: 52.
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Buried in his report, though, appeared ominous problems. In the 
report, he assessed the commander, Murungga, as earnest and energetic 
but "scarcely a real military leader." The weapons requested from 
Mongolia had not arrived and the Mongol force, whose ranks were 
swelled by defectors, was still more than half unarmed. Relations 
between the people and the army were good, but there was no political 
activity and no political workers to carry it out.
Murungga reported incredibly low casualty figures for the Mon­
gol unit—one dead and four wounded, with 1,000 of the enemy cap­
tured at Wudan alone. These figures made it clear either that the front 
line was not being entirely candid in its reports or that the Mongol 
force had won against no genuine resistance. Clearly the victories of 
the first ten days of combat were windfalls, something which the party 
could not rely on repeating in the face of genuine opposition. Oshirov, 
however, gave no indication of having tried to restrain Murungga from 
his plans for further expansion, even though consolidation was obvi­
ously necessary.
Within a few days, the tide turned against the Citizen Arjny. In 
three days of fighting against Zhang Zuolin's armies on the banks of the 
Liao River, the vanguard of the Citizen Armies was thrown into a 
chaotic retreat. By New Year's Day, Marshal Feng was in the mood to 
make peace; he resigned and went to the Soviet Union in the hopes that 
his removal might make prevent his enemies from allying against him. 
In January, however, Wu Peifli, leader of the Central Chinese warlord 
clique, and Zhang Zuolin came to terms and formed an alliance against 
Feng. Zhang’s armies moved back into the Rehe region in February, 
1926.
The pamphlets, instructors and some of the weapons demanded 
in mid-December did finally arrive from Ulaanbaatar late in that month 
and in the following January.^^ The Central Committee, however, 
seems to have lacked any firm plan, moving first from Zhangjiakou to 
Dolonnuur (to be closer to the front), then to Beijing (to try to control 
the Central Government's Court of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs), 
and then off to Ulaanbaatar (to consult with the MPRP).^^ As Oshirov
Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian, vol. 2 (v. 403), Guo . . ., 46a; 
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ruefully acknowledged later, many of the youth and officials who joined 
the party were wavering elements who dropped out when the tide 
turned against it.^"^ By the beginning of March, the whole of Rehe was 
in the hands of Zhang Zuolin's lieutenants, while less than fifty of the 
party's quondam 3,000-strong cavalry, escaped west to regroup in 
Suiyuan.68 Murungga's reputation, as well as those of others involved 
in the fiasco, seems to have suffered a major blow; he spent the next 
year in Mongolia, with no active role to speak of
Along with the fall of Rehe, Beijing also fell into the hands of 
the advancing armies. Even before the forces of Zhang Zuolin arrived, 
the care-taker government of Duan Qirui had cracked down on 
Guomindang activity. All the members of the Beijing Political Council 
fled: some like Xu Qian and Yu Youren fled to Mongolia to join 
Marshal Feng; others like the Communists Li Dazhao took refuge in the 
Soviet embassy. The embassy itself entered into a virtual state of siege. 
Embassy officials themselves were allowed limited movement, but 
anyone in contact with them was liable to be arrested. Unfortunately, 
Oshirov's movements, like much else about the Inner Mongolian party 
movement in this period, are obscure.
By the end of August, 1926, however, we know that Oshirov 
was with Serengdonrub, Merse, and some other members of the Cen­
tral Committee, were preparing a desperate attempt to establish a base 
in the Ordos region.^9 jhe Citizen Army's attempt to halt the advance 
of Zhang Zuolin northwest of Beijing had failed, and the force was 
disintegrating in the wake of defeat, turning into a predatory bandit 
horde that picked clean the roads west. The PRPIM originally thought 
that the remnants of the Citizen Army would retreat all the way to 
Gansu, leaving virtually all of the Chinese-settled areas of Inner 
Mongolia under the control of Zhang Zuolin. They hoped to build a 
rural base in the surrounding ethnically Mongolian steppes in which the 
party could subsist until a favorable turn in events occurred. In spring 
and summer, Wangdanima and Oljeijirgal had very encouraging success
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in getting duguilang members of several Ordos banners to join the 
party. In several places though, the local rulers reacted with brutal 
crackdowns, arresting, executing, or fining any who had connection 
with the "Red Party."
In late August, the Central Committee, accompanied both by 
Oshirov and the MPRP adviser, Nasunbatu, began a sweep through 
Ordos. Bringing a motley force of Ordos troops and the remnant of the 
Rehe campaign along with stores of about 300 rifles, they armed the 
duguilang!T()?LViy supporters, and forced the banner authorities to sign 
agreements that granted freedom of political activity to the duguilangs 
and the PRPIM. All the new military forces were placed under the 
ultimate control of the Central Committee. Despite the sudden death of 
Wangdanima on the eve of departure, the expedition was a tremendous 
success, with the party members achieving power in all but the two 
northeastern banners of Ordos.
In his only first-hand prolonged contact with the Inner Mongo­
lian countryside, Oshirov was struck above all by the insularity of the 
society and economy. Economically there was no unity even within the 
Ordos, let alone on an all-inner Mongolian scale. Each banner 
depended upon the neighboring Chinese areas for trade, and the result­
ing Chinese disunity had political repercussions as each Chinese 
province cultivated ties with neighboring banner princes and strove to 
keep each banner hostile to the others. Internally, Oshirov was struck 
by the odd phenomenon that the high lamas and incarnations tended to 
be vigorous supporters of the party and its reforms, while the secular 
nobility clung tenaciously to their old privileges. He attributed this 
unexpected support to the prestige of Wangdanima, who was one of 
the highest ranking incarnate lamas in the Ordos. Probing still deeper, 
though, he pinpointed the divisive role of Chinese colonization. The 
secular nobility used its administrative power to profit from the sale of 
Mongol lands and to secure bottom-soil rents from the immigrant 
Chinese tenants.
The lamas, however, who depended upon steady contributions 
from the faithful for their living, suffered as the Mongols were moved 
off the land and replaced by Chinese (who did not patronize the old 
monasteries). At Bagshi-yin Siime, Wangdanima's old residence, where 
Chinese colonization had been especially heavy, the several hundred 
resident lamas were patronized by only thirty households of Mongols. 
Thus the "religious feudalists" strongly supported the party's calls for
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responsible rule that would put the interests of the Mongol people as a 
whole above the selfish interests of the princes.
At the same time, Oshirov also remarked on the tension 
between the Mongols from eastern Inner Mongolia and those from 
Ordos. The East Mongols (as they called themselves), along with some 
Chinese, were concentrated in the force of forty to fifty soldiers that 
had been recruited in the Rehe campaign to the east. They also 
included, of course, Serengdonrub and many other prominent leaders in 
the Central Committee. The East Mongols considered themselves the 
most learned and advanced Mongols, due to their contact with secular, 
Chinese-oriented education, and looked down upon the Ordos Mongols 
as benighted and backwards herdsmen. Yet the problem was more 
severe than mere bad feeling. Oshirov did not inform his superiors that 
early in this campaign the two groups in the party's armed escort had 
come to blows and the Central Committee had been forced to execute 
two East Mongol youths for attempted mutiny. Here he was clearly 
covering for the party leadership, assuming (correctly) that no amount 
of explanation would overcome the impression of instability such news 
would cause.
Oshirov and Nasunbatu returned to Baotou when the expedition 
into Ordos was about half over.^^ Since the expedition had left for 
Ordos, many important things had happened. Marshal Feng had 
returned to Inner Mongolia, and openly joined the Guomindang party, 
officially putting his army under the Guomindang Canton government. 
Simultaneously, the Guomindang armies were scoring enormous suc­
cess in their northern expedition, rapidly reaching the Yangtze valley. 
The news threw much of the Inner Mongolian party leadership into a 
temporary euphoria. The planned Second Congress, to be held in the 
Ordos countryside, was abandoned and the leadership hurried back to
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Baotou to ask for Feng's approval to set up an Inner Mongolian Citizen 
Army. Feng seemed to approve, but showed far more enthusiasm for 
abolishing the Mongolian nobility and their traditional jurisdictions than 
for establishing any ethnic-democratic institutions in their place.
The great successes of the Guomindang in their southern bases 
suggested an alternative source of support. Perhaps the new National 
Government, now moving its headquarters from Canton to Wuhan on 
the Yangtze River, might be able to supply the PRPIM with money and 
weapons. Due to the occupation of Beijing by Zhang Zuolin’s 
counter-revolutionary armies, however, the party was unable to receive 
any reply from Wuhan. Thus A.I. Oshirov, along with Sainbayar, was 
dispatched to go to Wuhan and try to get aid from the Guomindang.
The party’s aim was to get 100,000 silver dollars and 5,000 
rifles from the Guomindang. Oshirov may have chosen to go in order 
to get back in touch with Voitinskii, in Shanghai, but the mission was 
not suited to him. It required above all the ability to impress Chinese 
leaders who knew little or nothing about Inner Mongolia. The mini­
mum requirement would be a fluent command of Chinese and some 
kind of name-recognition among the Chinese. Oshirov himself did not 
know Chinese, although his Inner Mongol companion, Sainbayar, did. 
Unfortunately, Sainbayar was the most junior member of the Presidium 
of the PRPIM's Central Committee and had no reputation at all. 
Apparently Oshirov and Sainbayar were dispatched largely because 
they were considered expendable in the eyes of the party's leadership, 
especially Serengdonrub. At the same time as Oshirov was being sent 
away, Nasunbatu, the Mongolian representative, was appointed com­
missar for the party’s new Military and Political School. After Nasun­
batu had returned to Mongolia in December, Serengdonrub and Merse 
repeatedly told the MPRP what an excellent person Nasunbatu was and 
how delighted the PRPIM would be if it could have another direct 
representative from the MPRP.^^ Clearly the PRPIM valued its link to 
Mongolia far above that to the Soviet Union.
Mission to the South, December, 1926-March, 1927
Oshirov left in early December as the party center was 
preparing to move west.^'^ Marshal Feng's open adherence to the
MPRP Central Party Archives: 7-1-19: 19, 35; 7-1-18: 17-18. 
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Guomindang had not strengthened his armies in Inner Mongolia; quite 
the contrary, it diverted his attention towards linking up with the GMD 
forces in Henan. Lacking the mounts to move them, his troops 
exploded millions of rounds of Italian ammunition as they evacuated 
Baotou, leaving the roadside littered with guns and ammunition 
dropped by the exhausted and demoralized troops.
Oshirov and Sainbayar arrived in Beijing and handed in a fairly 
optimistic report to the Soviet embassy on December 7. The situation 
in Beijing was depressing. The Fengtian Army’s white terror was in 
evidence everywhere. Engkhebatu, one of the founders of the party, 
was in jail and Oshirov, as a foreigner, was not allowed to see him. He 
was able to see the wife of Alta (Wu Zixing) another promising party 
leader who had disappeared while bringing money from Mongolia for 
the party's use. Alta had, in fact, been captured and executed by Zhang 
Zuolin's troops. Party members would come to Beijing from Inner 
Mongolia surreptitiously looking for someone with whom they could 
connect. Finding no one, they would depart fearful and disappointed. 
The only good news was that the Soviet embassy had received 
Oshirov’s earlier report on the Ordos situation as well as the Central 
Committee’s request to the Guomindang for aid. The embassy had 
wired the former to "the appropriate places" (probably meaning 
Voitinskii in Shanghai) and the latter to the Guomindang Party center. 
No reply was received. Li Dazhao, then trapped in the Soviet embassy 
and representing the remnants of the GMD in Beijing, subsequently 
suggested that going on to Wuhan would be better. The embassy pro­
vided travelling expenses for the trip.
Oshirov and Sainbayar spent little more than a week in Beijing. 
Then they sailed to Shanghai, where they spent most of their time with 
Voitinskii detailing the whole course of events. Voitinskii wired a 
status report to Moscow, together with the request for 100,000 silver 
dollars and 5,000 guns. In the preceding six months, Moscow had sent 
several telegrams questioning Grigorii on the progress of events in 
Inner Mongolia. It was only with Oshirov’s report that he was able to 
answer the questions.
Oshirov had arrived at Shanghai at a crucial moment in the 
Northern expedition. The Nationalist armies had liberated Hunan,
Central Committee of the PRPIM (MPRP Central Party Archives: 7-1-19: 
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Hubei, and Jiangxi provinces. In the course of December, 1926, the 
personnel of the National Government, which had been proclaimed lit­
tle more than a year ago in Canton, began an uncoordinated migration 
north to Wuhan. As the columns passed through Nanchang, the capital 
of Jiangxi, however, the commander-in-chief of the National Revolu­
tionary Army, Chiang Kai-shek tried to persuade as many as possible to 
stay there.Already political disagreements were surfacing while two 
alternative centers coalesced, one in Wuhan, where Borodin and Xu 
Qian, a former member of the BPC and past participant in negotiations 
with Mongolia, held power, and the other in Nanchang where Chiang 
Kai-shek and his military adviser Vasilii Bliicher held sway. Although 
Shanghai was still under warlord rule, the Nationalist party comrades 
there were already beginning to take sides in the budding conflict. 
Most supported Chiang and suggested that Oshirov go to Nanchang.
Oshirov took a boat to Nanchang, arriving there on January 7 
or 8, 1927. Although he come ostensibly to see the Commander-in- 
Chief Chiang, Oshirov felt cautious about involving the Inner 
Mongolian cause in the party split. Just before they arrived the army 
officers and party leaders in the city had convened and called for the 
National Government to move to Nanchang. So having arrived in 
Nanchang, Oshirov and Sainbayar waited until Chiang Kai-shek had left 
for Wuhan himself and then followed him the next day, January 12. 
When they arrived at the harborside, they saw for the first time the 
mass character of the Chinese revolution. The people of Wuhan had 
begun to drive the British out of their concessions and the foreigners' 
women and children had gone aboard warships floating off shore, while 
the men planned to defend the concessions with guns. Oshirov 
concluded that the right wing of the Guomindang had become 
frightened that the masses might "become completely red," and hence 
demanded that the government be moved to Nanchang and put under 
Commander Chiang. The left wanted to keep the party's Central 
Committee in charge, while the right wished to put it under the army, 
and break with the Communists. Oshirov’s own sympathies were 
clearly with the left.
When Oshirov met Xu Qian and Borodin together, the Wuhan 
leaders tried to be encouraging. Xu Qian, whom Oshirov probably 
knew from the summer of 1925 negotiations in Beijing, said: "The
See Vera Vladimirovna-Akimova, trans. Steven I. Levine, Two 
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Guomindang will certainly help Inner Mongolia. One hundred 
thousand joian is nothing, but still this should be decided in a meeting 
of the standing committee of the Guomindang." Borodin added that "It 
would be hard to confirm it now, when [the party] is split into two 
groups. We should wait until these people themselves understand what 
is happening and come back to re-unite. So there’s no reason for you 
to hurry." Only after talking with them did Oshirov and Sainbayar meet 
Chiang Kai-shek. As they outlined the need for money and rifles for 
Inner Mongolia, Oshirov knew enough Chinese to understand Chiang's 
occasional comments of shi, shi ("yes, yes") and duile, duile ("right, 
right"). When they concluded, Chiang, too, said this couldn’t be 
decided all at once and asked them to submit a written request. Sain­
bayar wrote one up in Chinese and submitted it, but on January 25, 
Chiang suddenly left for Nanchang after a public quarrel with Borodin, 
so they never had a chance to address the issue again.
Clearly, affairs in Inner Mongolia were not on anyone’s priority 
list in Wuhan. Xu Qian, feeling perhaps a twinge of conscience that 
these negotiations, like the ones with Mongolia he’d participated in a 
year and a half ago would again die for lack of interest on the Chinese 
side, arranged a last meeting of the Wuhan government leaders. As 
Oshirov later reported:
After we two stupid Mongols {buduulig Monggolchud) reported 
the entire situation. Comrade Xu read to them the secret telegram 
we had previously sent from Baotou. They all just stared at us 
blankly or ruffled through their things and didn’t ask a single 
question.
The request for money and rifles was referred to a special commission 
chaired by Xu. Afterwards, Borodin and Xu were hardly encouraging; 
if the right wing won, they said, even Marshal Feng’s forces would be 
cut off from supplies, let alone the Inner Mongols. Xu Qian told them 
that even in Guangdong, the authorities were frightened of the feng or 
"wind" of the Wuhan government.
Sainbayar tried to send a telegram to the PRPIM’s Central 
Committee, but (as usual) it was impossible to tell if it arrived at its 
destination. Wuhan and Nanchang continued to negotiate, and until the 
future of the Guomindang was decided, neither side had much time for 
two "stupid Mongols." Thus they decided Sainbayar would stay behind 
to pursue the question of aid, while Oshirov would return north via
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Shanghai. Before he left, Xu Qian managed to dig up 5,000 yuan, of 
which 1,000 could be used for Oshirov's travel expenses and 4,000 
could be wired by Xu Qian to Erkhimbatu, the PRPIM representative in 
Ulaanbaatar.
When he got to Shanghai, Oshirov had far worse news awaiting 
him. The embassy in Beijing had received news that off in the north­
west, the entire Central Committee of the PRPIM, from Serengdonrub 
and Merse on down, had been arrested by Zhang Zuolin’s troops. The 
only ray of hope was that one part of the rumors, at least, was obvi­
ously false; Oshirov too was said to be among those arrested. Oshirov 
thought in his pidgin Chinese: "I too had become meiyou fazi ('no 
way')." Clearly, travelling back to Inner Mongolia through Beijing was 
out of the question. At the same time he heard that the two factions 
had agreed to locate the central government in Wuhan, not Nanchang. 
"Chiang Kai-shek had become completely meiyou fazi," and Grigorii 
encouraged Oshirov to return to Wuhan to confirm the promise of aid. 
Oshirov however was too worried about the Central Committee and 
decided to return to Mongolia via the Soviet Union. Thus he sailed 
from Shanghai to the Japanese-leased port of Dalian (Dairen) and from 
there took the railway to Manzhouli and on to his old home of 
Verkhneudinsk, capital of the Buriat-Mongol Republic. Although he 
seems to have planned this trip as a temporary interlude, he would not 
return to Inner Mongolia again until 1931.
The first news he received in Verkhneudinsk was good. The 
Central Committee had only been plundered by bandits nominally 
belonging to Marshal Feng's armies. The Inner Mongols were quickly 
released and all were safe and sound. The incident luridly illustrated 
the disintegration of discipline in the Citizen Armies as they retreated 
west, but had done little material harm to the party. He called 
Erkhimbatu, the party's representative in Ulaanbaatar, and found out 
that the money had been received from Xu Qian. Happily Oshirov 
dictated a letter, dated March 8, 1927, to his friends in the Central 
Committee. He told them of the disappointments in the south, the split 
in the party, and the confidence among the Soviet advisers that the split 
was healed and Chiang Kai-shek had been brought back under party 
control. He told them that
Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Xu Qian and many Guomindang com­
rades . . .all asked after the health of the comrades in the Central
Committee and especially asked a lot about Serengdonrub and
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Merse. But as I was bu zhidao ("don’t know") in Chinese it was 
meiyou fazi ("no way") to remember all these names and I could 
just say hao, hao ("good, good") to them.
The leaders of the Chinese Communists had hoped Serengdonrub and 
Merse could come to their forthcoming Congress, but as Oshirov noted 
"It is another meiyou fazi. A-ya! When will we escape from all these 
meiyou fazis, comrades?!" Still, he was still optimistic-he thought the 
party ought to make plans for a final campaign against Zhang Zuolin 
(just as Chiang's adviser Blucher was doing). Oshirov himself planned 
possibly to go to Moscow to make again the plea for money and 
weapons.
The Party Split and Oshirov’s Return to Russia
Aleksandr Ivanovich Oshirov’s return from China came only a 
few months after his father's death on October 1, 1926.^^ Aleksandr 
had completely broken off any ties with his anti-Bolshevik parents, but 
most of the children had stayed on their kulak farm. Only one of 
Aleksandr’s older sisters, Antonina, actively associated with the new 
regime. She had joined the Youth League and after graduating from 
school went to a poor village to work with the people. While Alek­
sandr was gone, however, she contracted tuberculosis and died in 1925.
Now that the father of the family was dead, in spring 1927, 
Aleksandr visited his old homestead for a few days. The funeral had 
just been held as the frozen land thawed, and his sister Ina noticed the 
funny impression the soles of his new Chinese shoes made in the muddy 
courtyard. To her, Aleksandr gave the advice to work hard and 
scientifically "like an American," to be frugal, reuse her clothes, study 
hard, and keep clean. The emulation of American science was a slogan 
of the New Economic Policy period soon to be abandoned. Alek­
sandr's mother and brothers, however, continued to live their prosper­
ous way of life, one which would bring disaster on their heads in a few 
years.
In May, A.I. Oshirov went to Moscow. There, from May 7 to 
May 30, the Eighth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Com­
munist International was considering the significance of the dramatic 
news from China. First, there was the Zhang Zuolin regime's raid on
Information on Oshirov’s personal life in this section again derived 
from interviews with his younger sister and ward Ochiryn Namsraijaw.
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the Soviet embassy on April 6. Many Russian and Chinese Guomin- 
dang members were arrested; twenty Communists, including Li 
Dazhao, were publicly strangled by order of the warlord government. 
The second piece of news was Chiang Kai-shek's open break with the 
Communists on April 12-14, as gangs under his orders massacred 
hundreds of strikers in newly liberated Shanghai. From the night of 
April 14, another purge of Communists began in Canton as well. The 
question was: Who was meiyou fazi now?—Chiang Kai-shek and the 
right wing in Shanghai and Canton or the Left Guomin- 
dang-Communist government in Wuhan?
In addition, the policy on the Inner Mongolian revolution was 
also discussed. Oshirov was reporting on his mission to the south and 
on the request for money and aid. Yet in the few months since he had 
left, not only had the situation in China, but also that in the PRPIM, had 
undergone disturbing developments. The chairman of the Central 
Committee, Serengdonrub, and the secretary were caught up in a furi­
ous dispute over the party's ties with Feng’s Citizen Army. At first it 
had little to do with the issues animating the split between the right and 
the left in the south. After the retreat Merse blamed the party's 
troubles on the alliance with Feng. These allegations angered the local 
commander of the Citizen Army and Serengdonrub could only mollify 
him by assuring him Merse would be assigned out of Ningxia.^^ On 
April 4, 1927, officers in Feng's troops encouraged local Mongol party 
members in the central town of nearby Alashan banner to stage a coup 
d’etat. With the open backing of the unpopular Citizen Army and car­
ried out without the participation of the Central Committee, the seizure 
was a political disaster in terms of the party's objectives. The rural 
Mongol herdsmen and petty officials, led by a charismatic leader Mao 
Baatur, rallied to the defense of the old regime and the banner against 
the invading Chinese. Prince Tawangbiirugjal, one of the most conser­
vative rulers in Inner Mongolia, suddenly received the strong support 
of his people.^^ Merse was angered by the Chinese army's opposition
Nozu Akira ("Yejin Peng"), "Nei Menggu chihua yundong de 
bianqian," in Nei Menggu Daxue Zhong-Gong Nei Menggu Diqu Dangshi 
Yanjiu Suo, ed., Nei Menggu jindai shi yi cong, 154.
Zhuolike, "Guanyu Alashanqi 'Xiao Sanye shijian'" and Luo Yong- 
shou, "'Xiao Sanye shijian' shimo" in Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang 
Huiyi Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Weiyuanhui Wenshi Ziliao Yanjiu Weiyuanhui,
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to the PRPIM extending its activities into Alashan, but Serengdonnib 
insisted the party go along. Serengdonnib appeared increasingly 
impatient with dissent and entertained visions of a swift and victorious 
advance over the steppes when the southern forces reached Inner 
Mongolia. Serengdonnib temporarily dismissed Merse from the party 
center, and the latter proceeded to Mongolia, intending to call on the 
MPRP and the Comintern to back him up in the conflict.^®
Thus the Inner Mongolian party was splitting on its own, just as 
the Comintern's Executive Committee was considering how the splits in 
the Chinese revolution were to be handled. Unfortunately, the plenum's 
documents on Inner Mongolia have not yet been published.^ 1 To judge 
from the references to them in the PRPIM documents, the main 
decisions, presumably based on Oshirov's oral and Voitinskii's written 
report, called for the PRPIM to preserve its alliance with the Left 
KMT, but for the first time to treat the Chinese Communists as full 
partners in the Inner Mongolian revolution.
Tactics and personnel would be changed and the Central Com­
mittee would no longer base itself at Feng's headquarters. The goal of 
autonomy would be further clarified to demand an "Autonomous 
Republic"; that is. Inner Mongolia would have the same status in China 
that Buriatia had in Russia. The program and general aims as set out in 
the documents of the First Congress, however, would not be changed. 
When the Central Committee presidium members then in Ulaanbaatar 
(totaling five of the original seven) on May 31 demanded a Special 
Emergency Meeting (iuskhai yaaraltai khurat) and wired their request 
to Oshirov in Moscow, the latter replied saying that he would come 
with representatives of the Left KMT and the Chinese Communists, as 
well as additional Comintern representatives from Moscow.^^
By June 17, however, Moscow wired that Oshirov was sick and 
the Comintern would be represented at the Congress by the tough.
ed., Nei Menggu wenshi ziliao, vol. 4 (Khokhekhota, 1964; reprinted, 1979), 
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leather-jacketed Buriat commissar Matvei Innokent'evich Amagaev.*^ 
M.I. Amagaev was quite the opposite of Oshirov. Didactic and 
self-confident, he was often assigned to brief foreign visitors on the 
successes of the Mongolian revolution. Due to his genuine ability, he 
generally impressed foreigners, who described him as "a very knowl­
edgeable young Buriat Mongol" (Feng Yuxiang), or "spoken of by 
everyone as a man of prestige in the Mongolian revolution," "a zealot," 
"who in fact gave me the completest story of the history, growth, and 
problems of the National revolution in Mongolia" (Anna Louise 
Strong).
Suddenly Oshirov was "off the case." Since he was well 
enough to go back to his old job as Commissar of Agriculture in the 
Buriat-Mongol government, this dismissal clearly had a political com­
ponent. If we look at the criticisms Amagaev made at the PRPIM’s 
Special Congress (August 8-September 3, 1927), they concentrated on 
the leadership's policy of swift military victories to be won in alliance 
with the Citizen Army, and its disdain for building solid bases among 
the people in ethnically Mongolian areas. The bungling of the cam­
paign in Rehe and the lack of focus in Ordos were advanced as proof of 
these opportunistic errors.Yet as we have seen, Oshirov's reports, 
written as these errors were taking place, did not warn the Comintern 
of them. Oshirov clearly was unable to take on the leadership of the 
party and force it in a new direction, and so he was replaced.
Oshirov was safe from any serious political repercussions stem­
ming from this implicit rebuke, for he had married Mariia Mikhailovna 
Sakh'ianova, an old Buriat associate of M.N. Erbanov, the Chairman of 
the Council of People's Commissars of the BMASSR and herself the 
First Secretary of the Buriat Mongolian Provincial Party Committee 
{pbkorri). Bom in a wealthy Buriat family of eight daughters, she was 
given an unusual education for a Buriat woman of that era. She had 
been acquainted with both Russian and Buriat revolutionary youth 
while at school in Balagansk, after the 1905 Revolution. She went on
MPRP Central Party Archives: 7-1-26: 43.
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to a prestigious finishing school in Petrograd, the Bestuzhev Courses.*^ 
The effect was presumably otherwise than her parents intended, for by 
1917 she had become a staunch Bolshevik. After the October days, she 
returned to Irkutsk where in April 1918, she headed the Buriat Sector 
of the Central Siberian Bureau until the Czech revolt and the advance 
of White forces forced her to flee. Unlike V.I. Trubacheev, M.N. 
Erbanov, and others in the small group of Buriat Communists, M.M. 
Sakh'ianova spent the Civil War in Moscow, returning to Buriatia at the 
end of 1921. From March 1924, she became the First Secretary, and 
member of the Presidium of the Buriat Provincial Party Committee.*^
She and A.I. Oshirov must have known each other from 1921, 
if not from Irkutsk in 1918. Their backgrounds—Bolshevik children of 
wealthy, partially Russified, western Buriat farmer/ranchers-were quite 
similar. Both were true believers in the Bolshevik way of life, although 
Mariia was both several years older and far more prominent than 
Aleksandr. Despite M.M. Sakh'ianova's position, the couple followed 
the "commune" movement then current and shared an apartment with 
another couple in order to relieve the housing shortage. The squeeze 
was increased when, in the fall of 1927, Oshirov took his youngest 
sister Ina, then less than ten years old, from their mother to live with 
him in Verkhneudinsk. Thus Oshirov saved one member of his family 
from the fate that the government he served was preparing for them.
The beginning of collectivization coincided, perhaps not coinci­
dentally, with Sakh'ianova and Oshirov's transfer from Verkhneudinsk 
to Moscow. Mariia Mikhailovna joined the staff of the Central 
Committee, while Aleksandr Ivanovich was to receive a higher educa­
tion in the Communist Academy. At the same time collectivization was 
wiping out the Oshirov family. In the course of 1929-1930, Alek­
sandr’s mother and brothers, hard working Apollon, blue-eyed and 
bushy-eyebrowed Filipp, Petr, and Grigorii, the encyclopedia reader, 
were exiled without trial to the far North, one after another, for the 
crime of being wealthy in a poor country. Only the daughters escaped; 
Irina ran away to the north by herself, to Igarka. There she learned the
On this school, see Great Soviet Encyclopedia: A Translation of 
the Third Edition, vol. 3 (New York, 1973), under "Bestuzhev Courses" and 
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local Ewenki language and was eventually brought to Leningrad as a 
teacher of the same. Yet the price of escape was the constant fear of 
meeting any Buriat who knew her background. Once on a steamer on 
the Yenisey she saw her brother Grigorii. Not wishing to be 
recognized she casually sidled up to him and asked "How are you? 
Where are you going?" and he replied "Not far, to Turukhansk." 
Neither the sons nor their mother survived their exile by long. The 
oldest daughter, Radnaa (1900-1979), who had taken a job with a 
trading company in Chita may have seemed safer. She had married 
Dashi Sampilon, a Buriat official working in the Mongolian People's 
Republic. Yet her husband was disgraced in 1928-9, and was 
eventually executed, leaving Radnaa as the widowed mother of two 
children.
In Moscow, Aleksandr himself earned no economic advantage 
from his position of safety. He and his wife practiced the austere ethics 
of the Old Bolsheviks, accepting only the salary that accorded with the 
"party maximum" (no higher than a skilled worker's wage).^^ They 
lived near the Metropol' hotel in an area fashionable with the 
Communist elite and had a dacha, but food and clothes were always in 
short supply. They taught their young charge, his sister Ina, not to get 
rich or pretty herself Aleksandr and Mariia had little time for her, 
being always busy on the tasks of the revolution, but he did arrange for 
piano lessons. At the same time the house was a stopping point for 
both Buriats and Aleksandr's old associates in China. Grigorii Voitin- 
skii was a frequent guest, as was the Chinese communist Wang Ming. 
And Buriats, like the painter Tsyrenzhap Sampilovich Sampilov 
(1893-1953), noted for his oil-painting horse portraits, were always 
welcome in Aleksandr and Mania's house (despite the couple's 
self-imposed poverty).Oshirov's little sister Ina, recalls the New
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Year’s Day of 1932. Mariia was out working, and Aleksandr had left 
on a mission to China. Ina stayed home with a newly arrived Buriat 
actor, Khaptagaev, and wife Zoya Piritolchina, daughter of a woman 
doctor in Khiakhta. On the table there was nothing—only black bread 
and two pieces of dried vobla (Caspian roach fish) so hard that they 
had go outside to bang it into pieces. For drink they had only hot 
water, yet the guests insisted, "Well, O.K., it’s a fine New Year."
Meanwhile in Inner Mongolia things were going no better with 
the PRPIM than with Oshirov's own family. At the Special Congress in 
August 1927, Amagaev had not only redirected the party but com­
pletely replaced the old Central Committee with youth trained in Mos­
cow and Ulaanbaatar. Serengdonrub, Murungga and others were 
placed under virtual house arrest. In the beginning of October 1927, 
Serengdonrub and several of his associates escaped from Mongolia on 
a Citizen Army truck. Returning to the old party headquarters in 
Ningxia, he rallied his followers, proclaimed the decisions of the 
Special Congress null and void, and denounced the new Central 
Committee as puppets of the Soviet Communists. From October on, 
two Central Committees—the "old" one in Ningxia and the "new" one 
in Ulaanbaatar—competed for the allegiance of rural cells.
In western Inner Mongolia, the old Central Committee domi­
nated the area, sending out Sainbayar (who had come back from 
Wuhan in summer, 1927) to command all the local Mongol forces. Yet 
tensions between party center and the local troops came to a head in 
May-June 1928, when Sainbayar tried to order Oljeijirgal's forces back 
to Ningxia. Fearing to leave their own banner defenseless, the troops 
revolted and drove Sainbayar out. Just after Lunar New Year in 
February, 1929, Oljeijirgal was killed by disaffected elements in his own 
command.Elsewhere as well, conflicts between party members loyal 
to the old and new Central Committees ended in destruction of one or 
the other side and, in all cases, demoralization and apathy among the 
previously enthusiastic populace. By August 1928, the old Central 
Committee of the PRPIM in Ningxia was being dissolved by 
Serengdonrub, to be replaced by an Inner Mongolian Party Activities 
Steering Committee, subordinate to the Chinese Guomindang central 
executive committee. Yet despite the Guomindang conquest of North 
China, the Inner Mongolian status quo of despotic government by the
Altan’-orgil, Kdkeqota-yin tetiken monggol surbulji bicig, vol. 3, 
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nobility, continued Chinese colonization, and banditry, was not chal­
lenged.
Within the "new" faction, dissension also soon broke out. At 
the 1927 Special Congress, Amagaev had gotten the support of the 
student delegates by endorsing their resentment of Serengdonrub's 
sometimes harsh party discipline. At the same time, though, 
Amagaev’s new policy of patient base-building conflicted with the 
young students’ demand for immediate and direct support of revolution 
in Inner Mongolia. Even before the end of the Special Congress, many 
of the members of the old Inner Mongolian Youth Party studying in 
Ulaanbaatar, became critical of the slow party-building tactics of the 
"New" Central Committee. This group, soon dubbed the "youth 
faction," was convinced that with only a small effort promising areas 
(like Khdlon Buir) could be detached from Chinese control.
The next year, a group of youth led by Merse began a rebellion 
there in August, 1928. Thousands of Khblbn Buir people supported 
the rebels, but the Mongol officials of the area, including Erkhimbatu 
and other old party members, were alienated by the radical 
anti-feudalist line being propagated by the insurgents. Unable to pre­
sent a united front to the Chinese authorities, the rebellion was quickly 
suppressed, with hundreds of refugees crossing the border into Mon­
golia and thousands more being turned back at the frontier line. The 
party's numbers and prestige in Kholbn Buir plummeted, while disil­
lusioned leaders of the uprising, like Merse, left secret party work to try 
to work legally in the new government of China.
From the beginning of 1929 to 1931, the party leadership in 
Ulaanbaatar tried to recover from these failures. Instead of rebellions, 
they concentrated on propaganda publications and the penetration of 
Guomindang cells in Inner Mongolia. Ties with the remaining Ordos 
party organizations were maintained precariously and Inner Mongol 
students from Moscow and Ulaanbaatar were sent back to link up iso­
lated cells. The party’s program turned more radical, reflecting the 
collectivization drive in the Soviet Union and the hostile relations 
between the USSR and the Republic of China. Now the line called for 
alliance with the Communist Party of China and reliance on the
^2 "Nei Meng dangwu baogao," Minguo Ribao (Shanghai), March 
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"genuine poor people" (jingkhini yaduu buurai arad tumen); party 
pamphlets promised there would be no more senseless uprisings. The 
party’s line on independence-versus-autonomy was finessed with a 
concentration on the right of self-determination.
Yet from late 1930 to early 1931, several developments seem to 
have convinced the Comintern that a separate ethnic party in Inner 
Mongolia was not a viable development. There was only modest suc­
cess in expanding the secret party apparatus (and this occurred mostly 
in Turned and Chakhar regions). The latter was a predominantly Mon­
gol region, but in the Tiimed area, ethnic Chinese dominated both 
demographically and culturally and many of those who adapted best to 
the new policy of patient underground party-building were Sinicized, 
Chinese-speaking Tiimed Mongols.
Independently of the party, Mao Baatur, the popular militia 
leader in Alashan who had fought the Citizen Army on behalf of the 
legitimate banner prince, began to turn against the conservative gov­
ernment and secretly sought support from Mongolia. At the same time, 
Mao Baatur was allied with Hui (Chinese-speaking Muslim) rebels in 
Ningxia and Qinghai. The party center was very interested in linking 
the Uushin party regime with Mao Baatur and the Hui rebels, but the 
sectarianism and ethnic exclusiveness of PRPIM seemed to be 
preventing such a broad alliance.The Chinese Communists too were 
demanding that all revolutionary activists in Inner Mongolia ought to 
be brought under the supra-ethnic Chinese Communist Party, just as 
had happened in 1929-1930 with the Korean Communists in Northeast 
China.
At the same time, civil unrest in Mongolia, stemming from the 
government's inflationary and collectivization policy, was reaching a 
crisis point. The government was forced to close the border to stop the 
flow of refugees and it claimed the public discontent was the result of
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Chinese and Japanese provocateurs.^^ Finally, in January or February 
1931, the Mongolian Internal Security Office arrested partisans of the 
old "youth faction," accusing them (on very flimsy evidence) of being 
Guomindang spies and (with rather more solid evidence) of forming a 
secret group aiming to leave Mongolia and pursue revolution outside of 
Comintern control. A resulting security survey of Inner Mongols in 
Ulaanbaatar found most of them, even the party members, to be disaf­
fected and often with suspicious ties to renegades like Serengdonrub or 
Merse.^^ Clearly, disaffection in the Inner Mongolian party ranks was 
intersecting fatefully with a dramatically heightened sensitivity to pre­
sumed security threats in the Mongolian host state.
In this context, the Comintern devised a new policy for Inner 
Mongolia in July, 1931. The PRPIM would become subject to a 
Northwest Special Committee, under the Chinese Communist Party and 
chaired by veteran Chinese Communist Party member Wang Ruofei. In 
reality, though, the committee would receive its directives straight from 
the Comintern's Executive Committee in Moscow. It would handle all 
revolutionary activities in Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Shanxi, and 
Suiyuan, and would be situated in Ningxia. The Committee's secretary 
Wang Ruofei (1896-1946) and Ji He (1905-1983) would go first to 
Baotou and establish the eastern center, while a western center would 
be established in Ningxia (where liaison could be made between the 
Ordos Mongols, Mao Baatur and the Hui rebels). For this western 
branch, the Comintern selected Fan Enpu (c. 1898-1970) and A.I. 
Oshirov. When the underground Baotou-Ningxia communication route 
had been established, Wang and Ji would go west to join Fan and 
Oshirov in Ningxia.
Aleksandr Ivanovich began preparing for the mission, sewing 
documents into Mongolian robes, and bringing a powerful radio 
transmitter, three feet long, home to his apartment. The team left from 
Moscow early in September, 1931, and passed through Ulaanbaatar,
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where a Russian, Chernomorduk, was now representing the Comintern. 
While there, they received the news of the Japanese seizure of Shen­
yang in Northeast China, and the growing danger of war. Documents 
issued from the Chinese Communist Party denouncing Japanese impe­
rialism were added to their materials. Two Inner Mongols, Badma and 
Zhu Shifu, were assigned to escort the western and eastern groups, 
respectively, across the border under the cover of being merchants. As 
they approached the Mongolian border the two teams switched to 
camel caravans. Early PRPIM members had often travelled this route, 
but as Mongolia became more secretive and the border guard tighter, 
the often-used merchant cover became less convincing. So it proved in 
this case.
As Oshirov, Badma, and Fan Enpu were crossing the border 
from Mongolia into Inner Mongolia, they were searched by Alashan 
banner border guards, the radio transmitter was discovered, and the 
group arrested. The Alashan Mongol border troops tied the three up 
and interrogated them in the station but they refused to talk. The 
agents were then left outside, trussed up in the cold desert night. 
Despite their severe frostbite they still refused to divulge the object of 
their mission. Fan Enpu, however, wimpering and coughing blood, was 
clearly on the verge of breaking. The border troops sent the men along 
to the center of Alashan banner where they were interrogated in the 
presence of the banner rulers. Each was beaten thirty times with a club 
to soften them up. The next time. Fan (who appeared to be the 
weakest) was brought in alone. The mere threat of further beatings 
induced him to confess the entire story, including the real identities of 
Wang Ruofei and the secret communications with Mao Baatur. Fan 
was released for his cooperation, but Oshirov, who had resisted torture
to the end, was executed. 1^0
Conclusion
Despite the loss of the western team, Wang Ruofei did reach 
Baotou. There he linked up with the Turned Mongolian underground 
and prepared the reorientation of party work away from Mongol
On the execution of Oshirov, see Hao Weimin, "Di yi, erci guonei 
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nationalism and secession and towards a United Front against Japan. 
On November 22, he too was arrested on the strength of Fan's accusa­
tion. Yet the change in approach was accepted among the Tiimed 
Mongols and the PRPIM underground located there was rapidly put 
under direct Comintern supervision. It seems the Uiishin Banner party 
committee did not accept the change and its separatist regime survived 
in isolation until 1935, when the Chinese government finally exerted the 
effort to get rid of it. Mao Baatur, also on the strength of Fan's 
confession, was arrested and sentenced to one year. After his release 
he went to Ningxia to serve under the military governor there.
In Mongolia, the PRPIM Central Committee survived for a few 
more years. From the moment of the Japanese invasion of Northeast 
China, though, the struggle of the Inner Mongolian people for freedom 
from Chinese warlord oppression, a fixture of Mongolian propaganda 
from 1925 on, vanished, never to return. Instead, the line was changed 
to be all the people of China fighting together against Japanese impe­
rialism. Nor did the security services relent, fingering yet more impa­
tient young students as continuers of the earlier deviations. The 
date is obscure, but perhaps in September, 1933, the PRPIM Central 
Committee was formally abolished by the Communist International. 
Most of the remaining members in Mongolia stayed there—in any case 
they would not be allowed to leave—and perished in Stalin’s hecatombs 
of 1937-1939.
A.I. Oshirov's life thus spanned almost the complete course of 
the first People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia. He was
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the party’s Eastern Branch underground until 1945 when it reappeared and 
played a major role in the ensuing revolutionary transformation of Inner 
Mongolia—see Christopher Atwood, "The East Mongolian Revolution and 
Chinese Communism," Mongolian Studies 15 (1992), 7-83.
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intimately involved in its unification and expansion in the summer of 
1925 in Beijing, and six years later was carrying out orders for its de 
facto replacement when he was executed. He and his wife were sincere 
believers in the Communist ideal and sacrificed virtually their whole 
private lives for it. His young sister, Ina, who lived with him from 1927 
to 1931, remembers above all the couple’s revolutionary "pathos."
From the time Oshirov joined the revolution in 1920, he broke 
off all ties with his wealthy family, doing nothing to save it from 
destruction in the "liquidation of the kulaks as a class." His friends in 
Moscow were revolutionary comrades like Voitinskii, Voitinskii’s 
consumptive wife Mariia Kuznetsova, and Wang Ming. ^s Alek­
sandr passed through Ulaanbaatar on the way back to Inner Mongolia, 
his sister Radnaa caught a glimpse of him there in the distance, but he 
never once came to see her. News of his death was not received until 
two years later, when Grigorii Voitinskii informed M.M. Sakh’ianova 
and his sister. Aleksandr Oshirov left no children, nor did his wife 
remarry. When decades later his sister Ina tried to find the old Oshirov 
home there was nothing left, not even the Oshirovs' home village of 
Togot itself The only remains were the grave of Ivan Anatol'evich, 
buried in the woods.
Yet as his reports show, Oshirov was no zealous dogmatist. 
Among his comrades, he seemed cheerful and humorous, but perhaps 
not a very impressive fellow. He lacked the self-confidence and 
learning that impressed foreign visitors in Amagaev. His career shows 
that the Comintern agents did not have any automatic authority which 
made their wishes, or those of their superiors, commands for the local 
parties. The authority that Borodin and others had in China was a 
result of the wealth of experience they had in running a revolutionary 
party. As it turned out, a good deal of that experience was useless or 
harmful under the conditions of Asia, but the record also shows that the 
native revolutionaries were no less fallible if not more so.^®^ The
Kuznetsova’s strong impression on a group of Chinese working 
women is recorded in Vishnyakova-Akimova, Two Years in Revolutionary 
China, 288-9. Ina Oshirova was also profoundly affected by her soulfulness 
and maternal solicitude.
In his discussion of the 1927 Canton uprising, often considered 
the most egregious of the Comintern’s mistakes, Nie Rongzhen strongly criti­
cizes the agent on the spot, Heinz Neumann. Yet at the same time, Nie freely 
admits that the rebellion was not necessarily a bad idea—and that it was
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history of the Inner Mongolian party has been hitherto virtually totally 
ignored but it has also been spared the retrospective glorification of 
whoever clawed his way to the top to become the glorious Leader. As 
it appears in the documents, the native leaders Serengdonrub, Merse, or 
Oljeijargal were not infallible guides thwarted by blundering foreigners 
incapable of seeing the obvious, but people who, just like Oshirov, 
Amagaev and the other Comintern advisers, were learning as they went 
along, and were battling-more often than not unsuccessfiilly--their own 
prejudices and errors.
botched by inexperience all down the line. See his Inside the Red Star: The 
Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen (Beijing, 1988), 66-73, 76-79.
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(Left to right) A.I. Oshirov, Vsevolod I. Pudovkin (director), and Valeri 
Inkizhinov (lead actor), while filming Potomak Chingis-khana (English 
version: "Storm Over Asia"), 1928.
Director V.I. Pudovkin shot much of this film on location in Buriatia. While 
there, he relied on Oshirov to supply authentic details of Mongolian life. The 
film's initial sequence, for example, showing guests arriving at the 
protagonist's yurt was filmed exactly as Oshirov directed. (Jay Leyda, Kino: 
A History of the Russian and Soviet Film (New York, 1960: 248-9). Oshirov 
got much of his knowledge of old Mongol customs and partisan warfare from 
his experience in Inner Mongolia.
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A.I. Oshirov in Moscow shortly before leaving for his last trip to Inner 
Mongolia (1931).
A Buriat Agent in Inner Mongolia 93
Buriatia, Mongolia, and Inner Mongolia in 1925
